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ANONYMITY IN CYBERSPACE: WHAT CAN 
WE LEARN FROM JOHN DOE? 
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky* 
Abstract: This Article examines the evolution of the law governing libel 
suits against anonymous “John Doe” defendants based on Internet speech. 
Between 1999 and 2009, courts crafted new First Amendment doctrines 
to protect Internet speakers from having their anonymity automatically 
stripped away upon the filing of a libel action. Courts also adapted exist-
ing First Amendment protections for hyperbole, satire, and other non-
factual speech to protect the distinctive discourse of Internet message 
boards. Despite these positive developments, the current state of the law 
is unsatisfactory. Because the scope of protection for anonymous Internet 
speech varies greatly by jurisdiction, resourceful plaintiffs can make stra-
tegic use of libel law to silence their critics. Meanwhile, plaintiffs who are 
truly harmed by cybersmears will find little effective recourse in libel law. 
Though disheartening, the current state of the law may be a testament to 
the difficulty of balancing speech and reputation in the Internet age. 
Introduction 
 Ten years ago, libel suits against anonymous “John Doe” defendants 
based on Internet postings were rare.1 Only a few Doe cases2 had made 
                                                                                                                      
* © 2009, Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Stephen C. O’Connell Chair, University of Florida 
Levin College of Law. Thanks to Daniel Friedel for his invaluable research assistance. 
1 See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49 
Duke L.J. 855, 858 n.6 (2000) (listing libel cases as of 2000). Federal law largely bars libel 
suits against Internet service providers and website operators based on defamatory content 
posted by third parties. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006). Courts have interpreted broadly the 
scope of immunity provided by § 230. See, e.g., Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330–35 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1174–75 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding website operator responsible for content posted by third 
parties where it “directly participate[d] in developing the alleged illegality”). 
2 I refer here only to the Doe cases involving libel and related tort claims, and not to 
the separate line of Doe cases involving copyright infringement via file-sharing. The copy-
right infringement cases against Doe defendants involve a different, and arguably more 
limited, speech interest than the libel cases. See Sony Music Entm’t Inc. v. Does 1–40, 326 F. 
Supp. 2d 556, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (discussing the limited First Amendment interests in-
volved in downloading files). For that reason, courts have balanced the relevant First 
Amendment interests differently in copyright infringement cases than in libel cases involv-
ing Doe defendants. See, e.g., Arista Records LLC v. Does 1–16, No. 1:08-CV-765, 2009 WL 
414060, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009) (“Because of the modest First Amendment right to 
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their way into reported decisions3 and few judges seemed sensitive to 
the First Amendment issues involved.4 Today, much has changed in both 
the nature of the Doe suits and courts’ handling of them. This Article 
examines the evolution of this area of law and attempts to extract prin-
ciples and insights relevant to emerging Internet speech disputes. 
I. In the Beginning 
 Initially, the Doe cases tended to present as Goliath versus David 
scenarios. The typical Goliaths were companies or their leaders suing 
for libel after one or many “John Does” criticized them online, usually 
on a financial message board. After filing suit, the corporate Goliaths 
sought to obtain the identities of the Doe defendants by subpoenaing 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs). From there, it was usually a short step 
to unmasking the John Does. Many ISPs turned over the identifying 
information without even notifying the Does that it was being sought.5 
Even with notice, few Does had the resources to find counsel and file 
motions to quash. Those few Does who did file motions were often met 
with judicial hostility.6 Many judges had little understanding of the cul-
ture of Internet message boards and simply ordered disclosure with no 
concern for the unique First Amendment interests involved. 
 These early Doe suits threatened First Amendment values and 
highlighted deficits in the U.S. Supreme Court’s libel and anonymous 
speech jurisprudence. One major concern was the potential chilling 
effect of these lawsuits. Although any libel action is likely to have a chill-
ing effect, the sudden proliferation of actions against defendants of 
modest means merely for speaking their minds threatened to subvert 
the Internet’s promise of a more fully participatory public discourse.7 
                                                                                                                      
remain anonymous when there is an allegation of copyright infringement, the Court must 
balance the tension between this minimally protected constitutional right and a copyright 
owner’s right to disclosure of the identity of a possible trespasser of its intellectual property 
interest.”). 
3 See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 858 n.6. 
4 See e.g., id. Lee Tien was one of the first scholars to recognize the unique challenges 
of anonymous Internet speech cases. See generally Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous 
Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 Or. L. Rev. 117 (1996). 
5 Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 n.5 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (dis-
cussing the problem of lack of notice). 
6 See, e.g., Hvide v. John Does 1 through 8, No. 99-22831 CA 01, court order at 52-54 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. May 25, 2000) (on file with author, who was acting as counsel for one of the 
Does at a hearing in which the judge compared anonymous Internet speakers to hooded 
Ku Klux Klan members and admitted that she did not use the Internet extensively). 
7 For an extended version of this argument, see Lidsky, supra note 1, at 888–98. 
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 The revolutionary promise of the Internet as a medium of mass 
communication is to open the “marketplace of ideas” to all citizens.8 
The “old” mass media—newspapers, magazines, books, and broadcast-
ers—placed a gatekeeper between the speaker and her audience.9 The 
Internet removed that gatekeeper, allowing more speakers than ever 
before to reach a mass audience.10 The resulting “democratization” of 
discourse made it harder for those in power to control the interpreta-
tion of public events and exposed them to criticism from new quar-
ters.11 And that in turn spurred the John Doe suits.12 
 Some newly empowered speakers were responsible critics publish-
ing uncomfortable truths and constitutionally protected opinions, but 
others were not.13 Both types of speakers, however, became targets of 
libel actions aimed at suppressing criticism and reestablishing existing 
hierarchies.14 These often well-publicized actions signaled not only to 
named defendants, but to prospective critics as well, that they could be 
easily unmasked and subjected to costly litigation where the outcome 
hinged on the vagaries of a libel law not yet adapted to the cultures of 
Internet speech. Although the extent of the chilling effect was inher-
                                                                                                                      
8 See id. at 894–95 (“The Internet gives citizens inexpensive access to a medium of mass 
communication and therefore transforms every citizen into a potential ‘publisher’ of in-
formation for First Amendment purposes.”). 
9 Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2004) (“Mass media create a technological 
bottleneck, and the people who control mass media are gatekeepers controlling its use.”). 
10 As one scholar has noted, the characteristics of Internet speech include immediate 
publication without the intervention of intermediaries or editors to an international audi-
ence. Yuval Karniel, Defamation on the Internet—A New Approach to Libel in Cyberspace, 2 J. 
Int’l Media & Ent. L. 215, 220 (2009). The resulting speech, which may be anonymous, is 
potentially accessible, both freely and for free, to a mass audience. Id. 
11 See Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005). It is easy to overhype the revo-
lutionary potential of the Internet. Citizens still need substantial resources to use the In-
ternet to reach a mass audience, and even in the online environment, the traditional mass 
media still “provide a focal point for audience attention.” Balkin, supra note 9, at 10; accord 
Matthew Hindman, The Myth of Digital Democracy (2008). 
12 Or at least, it spurred John Doe suits after § 230 of the Communications Decency 
Act (“CDA”) foreclosed access to the most readily identifiable deep pocket defendant. See 
supra note 1. 
13 See, e.g., Lidsky, supra note 1, at 866–68 (discussing the complaint in HealthSouth 
Corp. v. Krum). 
14 See Ford Motor Co. v. Lane, 67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (noting, in 
the trade secret context, that “[t]echnology blurs the traditional identities of David and 
Goliath”). See generally Elizabeth A. Rowe, Proposing a Mechanism for Removing Trade Secrets 
from the Internet, 12 No. 3 J. Internet L. 3 (2008) (providing further discussion of the 
problems caused by Internet disclosures of trade secrets); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret 
Litigation and Free Speech: Is It Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1425 (2009) 
(same). 
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ently unquantifiable, the Doe suits quickly became a serious concern 
for First Amendment advocates. 
  In addition to the inherently nebulous threat of chilling Internet 
speech, the Doe suits also threatened a specific First Amendment 
right—the right to speak anonymously. The technology and culture of 
the Internet multiplied exponentially the number of anonymous speak-
ers contributing to public discourse. The right to speak anonymously, 
however, is not an absolute right. Speakers have no right to use ano-
nymity as a shield against liability for defamation.15 The difficulty for 
courts is that it is not always easy to discern whether a statement is de-
famatory. Calling a company a “scam” might be defamatory or it might 
be mere hyperbole; it all comes down to context. Thus, resourceful 
plaintiffs can file (or threaten to file) for libel almost any time they en-
counter harsh criticism online. If a mere allegation of libel, without 
more, is enough to force the unmasking of the alleged defamer, the 
First Amendment right to speak anonymously is largely meaningless. As 
of 1999, however, First Amendment jurisprudence provided defendants 
little protection from having their anonymity stripped away by the filing 
of a libel action.16 
II. The New Legal Landscape 
 The legal landscape has altered considerably in the intervening 
decade. Faced with a growing number of anonymous speech cases, 
many courts have not only developed new legal doctrines to address the 
issues raised by the Doe cases, but have also made existing doctrines 
responsive to the culture of Internet discourse. 
A. Development of New Legal Doctrines 
 Although the law governing anonymous speech is still developing, 
courts are beginning to converge on a set of standards to balance the 
right to speak anonymously with the rights of those injured by defama-
tory anonymous speech.17 Put simply, these standards, or balancing 
                                                                                                                      
15 Or any other tort or crime. 
16 See Lidsky, supra note 1, at 858 n.6. 
17 For an illustrative sample of Doe cases and unmasking standards, arranged chrono-
logically, see Best W. Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. CV-06-1537-PHX-DGC, 2006 WL 2091695, at *4–
*5 (D. Ariz. July 25, 2006); Highfields Capital Mgmt. L.P. v. Doe, 385 F. Supp. 2d 969, 975–
76 (N.D. Cal. 2005); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 
2001); In re Baxter, No. 01-00026-M, 2001 WL 34806203, at *12 (W.D. La. Dec. 20, 2001); 
Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe 1, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 231, 244–46 (Ct. App. 2008); Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460–61 (Del. 
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tests, are designed to sort legitimate defamation actions from “cyber-
slapps” —unfounded suits designed only to chill speech—at an early 
stage of the discovery process. Courts have crafted slightly different 
verbal formulae and added a varying number of factors to their tests, 
but most tests boil down to two main components. 
 The first component provides John Doe notice of the lawsuit and 
an opportunity to file a motion to quash to protect his anonymity.18 
Obviously, the notice requirement cannot be applied too stringently 
when the defendant’s identity is unknown. Thus, courts have held that 
plaintiffs can satisfy this component by posting notice of the suit in the 
forum where Doe allegedly posted his defamatory statement.19 Once 
notice is given,20 the Doe has a short window of opportunity to assert 
his First Amendment rights.21 
 The second component of the balancing test requires plaintiffs to 
provide some indicia that their suits are viable libel actions before the 
                                                                                                                      
2005); Indep. Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2009); Dendrite Int’l, 
Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena 
Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc. (In re AOL), 52 Va. Cir. 26, 37 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 
(Va. 2001). I have previously offered my recommendations for what type of standards 
should govern disclosure of the Doe defendants’ identity. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas 
F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and Anonymous Speech, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1537, 1598–
1602 (2007). 
18 See, e.g., Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61; Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457. 
19 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61 (“[W]hen a case arises in the internet context, the plain-
tiff must post a message notifying the anonymous defendant of the plaintiff’s discovery 
request on the same message board where the allegedly defamatory statement was origi-
nally posted.”). But see Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244 (noting that even this is not a fixed 
requirement when the original Internet forum is no longer available or when the defen-
dant clearly has received notice by other means, such as via his Internet service provider or 
the message board sponsor). 
20 Many ISPs now give their subscribers notice that their identity is being sought via 
subpoena. It would be even better if they were required to do so by statute. For example, 
federal law already prohibits operators of cable systems from disseminating subscriber data 
without consent, except in certain circumstances including when disclosure is necessary to 
render service and when disclosure is made to the government pursuant to a court order, 
in which case the subscriber must receive notice. See 47 U.S.C. § 551(c) (2006); see also 
Fitch v. Doe #1, 869 A.2d 722, 728–29 (Me. 2005) (holding that a cable system operator 
ISP could release subscriber information to a nongovernmental entity if the disclosure was 
made subject to a court order and the subscriber was notified). 
21 See Roger M. Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet 
Defamation, L.A. Law, Oct. 2001, at 19 (“Most ISPs now give their account holders two or 
more weeks’ notice of a subpoena before divulging any information in response to it.”); see 
also Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 
Yale L.J. 320, 349 (2008) (discussing advantages of a flexible rather than fixed time for 
response). 
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court will order disclosure of defendants’ identities.22 Courts have 
framed this component in various ways, ranging from requiring: (1) a 
“good faith basis” for plaintiff’s claim;23 (2) pleadings sufficient to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss;24 (3) a showing of evidence sufficient to estab-
lish a prima facie case of defamation coupled with a balancing of the 
right to speak anonymously and the right to pursue a libel claim;25 and 
(4) a showing of evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment, with-
out the additional balancing test.26 Of these, the third standard—the 
prima facie case plus balancing standard—appears to be gaining ground 
as the dominant standard.27 
 Indeed, the Maryland Court of Appeals adopted this standard in 
2009 in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie.28 Specifically, the court 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 449–56 (reviewing the different “viability” standards employed 
by state and federal courts in John Doe cases). In the Doe cases decided thus far, courts 
appear to have assumed that the speech involved receives full First Amendment protection 
unless it is libelous. Courts have not addressed whether the balance between the interests 
of plaintiff and defendant should be struck differently if plaintiff is a private figure and the 
speech is of only private concern. It also remains to be seen how courts will decide cases 
involving allegedly defamatory commercial speech. 
23 See 2TheMart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095; In re AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37. 
24 See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(involving trademark infringement claim against a John Doe rather than libel); Lassa v. 
Rongstad, 718 N.W.2d 673, 687 (Wis. 2006) (“When faced with an assertion of constitu-
tional privilege against disclosure of information identifying otherwise-anonymous organi-
zation members, the circuit court should decide a pending motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim before sanctioning the party for refusing to disclose that information.”). 
25 This standard borrowed from Dendrite International, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 
(N.J. Super. A.D. 2001), was recently adopted by Maryland’s highest court in Independent 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie. 966 A.2d at 457; see also Greenbaum v. Google, Inc., 845 N.Y.S.2d 
695, 698–99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007) (applying qualified Dendrite standard). 
26 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460–61. Cahill held that a plaintiff must support his claim with 
facts sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See id. at 460; see also McMann v. 
Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 266–68 (D. Mass. 2006) (applying Cahill standard); In re Does 1–
10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 821–23 (Tex. App. 2007) (same). This list oversimplifies the situation 
somewhat, as some courts have adopted their own variations on one of these standards. See, 
e.g., Mobilisa, 170 P.3d at 720–21 (adopting hybrid of Cahill and Dendrite standards). One 
court has held that its existing procedural rules, which allow defendants to move for pro-
tective order against discovery “sought in bad faith” or that “would cause unreasonable 
annoyance, embarrassment, [or] oppression” were sufficient to protect Doe defendants’ 
First Amendment interests. Klehr Harrison Harvey Branzburg & Ellers, LLP v. JPA Dev., Inc., 
No. 0425 Mar. Term 2004, 2006 WL 37020, at *9 (Pa. Com. Pl. Jan. 4, 2006). The great 
variety in legal standards suggests the need for a uniform rule to govern John Doe cases. 
27 For examples of courts applying Dendrite-based standards, see supra note 25. For ex-
amples of courts applying Cahill-based standards, see supra note 26. 
28 966 A.2d at 457. In Brodie, the plaintiff sued a newspaper and three “John Does” for 
statements they posted on the newspaper’s website. Id. at 442. The plaintiff, a businessman, 
sued for defamation and “conspiracy to defame” and subpoenaed the newspaper to reveal 
the identities of “John Does” associated with five screen names on its website. Id. The trial 
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held that in a defamation action involving anonymous speakers, a trial 
court should not order disclosure until five criteria are satisfied.29 The 
first two criteria ensure that defendants have notice and an opportunity 
to defend.30 The third requires the plaintiff to identify with specificity 
the allegedly defamatory statements made by defendants.31 The fourth 
requires the trial court to “determine whether the complaint has set 
forth a prima facie defamation per se or per quod action against the 
anonymous posters.”32 Finally, “if all else is satisfied, [the trial court 
must] balance the anonymous poster’s First Amendment right of free 
speech against the strength of the prima facie case of defamation pre-
sented by the plaintiff and the necessity for disclosure of the anony-
mous defendant’s identity, prior to ordering disclosure.”33 A few com-
ments are in order regarding the third and fourth criteria. 
 First, the prima facie evidence standard offers Doe defendants lit-
tle protection if it can be satisfied with “mere allegations of fact.”34 
Thus, in applying the standard, courts have required the plaintiff to 
produce “sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of 
action, on a prima facie basis.”35 Second, a plaintiff can only be ex-
pected to provide prima facie evidence regarding those elements of the 
claim within the plaintiff’s control.36 Plaintiffs ordinarily will have ac-
                                                                                                                      
court promptly dismissed the newspaper from the case because it was immune from suit 
under the Communications Decency Act. Id. at 445. The trial court, however, denied the 
newspaper’s motion for a protective order and required disclosure of the identities associ-
ated with five screen names. Id. at 447. Notably, plaintiff sued only three of these defen-
dants: “CorsicaRiver,” “Born & amp; Raised Here,” and “chatdusoleil.” Id. at 448. Plaintiff 
did not include “RockyRaccoonMD” and “Suze” in the suit, but alleged that they had made 
defamatory statements. Id. at 448–49. The trial court nonetheless ordered disclosure re-
garding all five screen names. Id. at 447. The Maryland Court of Appeals reversed, holding 
that the plaintiff “had not pleaded a valid defamation claim against any of them.” Id. As a 
matter of defamation law, this holding is unexceptional. The three named defendants—
”CorsicaRiver,” “Born & amp; Raised Here,” and “chatdusoleil”—had posted statements 
about someone other than plaintiff, and plaintiff’s potential claims against two others—
”RockyRaccoonMD” and “Suze”—were barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 448–49. 
29 Id. at 457. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (Adkins, J., concurring). 
35 Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760. 
36 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245 (“A plaintiff need produce evidence of only those 
material facts that are accessible to her.”); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 463 (requiring, under 
a summary judgment standard, the plaintiff to “introduce evidence creating a genuine 
issue of material fact for all elements of a defamation claim within the plaintiff’s control”) 
(emphasis added). 
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cess to evidence regarding most elements of a defamation action at the 
outset of litigation. For example, a public figure defamation plaintiff 
must ordinarily plead and prove that the defendant published a false 
and defamatory communication concerning plaintiff with “actual mal-
ice” —i.e., with knowledge or reckless disregard of its falsity.37 If plain-
tiff’s claim is valid, he or she should have “easy access to proof” of all of 
these elements except actual malice.38 Moreover, it is not unfair to ex-
pect the plaintiff to produce this evidence. The plaintiff will ultimately 
bear this burden anyway, and the new standard merely requires produc-
tion of prima facie evidence prior to disclosure of defendant’s identity. 
 An additional comment is in order regarding the balancing test 
applied in addition to the prima facie evidence standard. Arguably, a 
separate balancing test is unnecessary because a balancing of interests 
is built into the prima facie evidence standard.39 Under the prima facie 
evidence standard, the defendant’s right to speak anonymously out-
weighs the plaintiff’s right to pursue a libel action unless and until the 
plaintiff presents evidence that the libel claim is viable; once this bur-
den is met, the balance tips in favor of allowing plaintiff to pursue a 
claim for vindication of her reputation. An explicit balancing test serves 
only to tilt the scales further toward the protection of anonymous 
speech because presumably it allows even a viable defamation claim to 
be dismissed on the ground that it is not strong enough to outweigh 
defendant’s First Amendment interests.40 
 Although courts may be converging on standards for curbing the 
use of libel suits to breach the right to speak anonymously, the piece-
meal, state-by-state development of standards continues to make the 
scope of protection for John Does uncertain. Regardless of how high 
courts set the bar for plaintiffs for obtaining a John Doe’s identity, these 
                                                                                                                      
37 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding that public 
officials suing for defamation must prove actual malice); see also Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (extending New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to encompass public 
figures). For further explanation, see Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & R. George Wright, 
Freedom of the Press: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 67–70 
(2004). 
38 Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464. 
39 See, e.g., id. at 461 (asserting that balance is built into its summary judgment stan-
dard); Brodie, 966 A.2d at 458 (Adkins, J., concurring) (criticizing separate balancing test 
as “unnecessary and needlessly complicated”). 
40 One potential advantage of a separate balancing test is that it would allow the court 
to consider, in camera, a defendant’s actual motive for speaking anonymously before order-
ing disclosure. For example, if defendant could show that she spoke anonymously because 
she feared physical retaliation, a court might be more inclined to dismiss a viable defama-
tion claim. 
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new standards will provide insufficient protection to anonymous online 
speech unless judges apply existing libel doctrines in ways that are re-
sponsive to the distinctive culture of Internet discourse. Luckily, there 
are signs that courts are doing just that.41 
B. Nuanced Application of Existing Doctrine 
 Judges today are much more likely to have actually visited or used 
a chat room, message board, blog, or social network than they were a 
decade ago, and their familiarity with Internet discourse makes for bet-
ter legal decisions in John Doe cases. A good illustration of how judicial 
understanding of Internet culture can affect outcomes in libel cases 
may be seen in the 2008 case, Krinsky v. Doe 6, decided by the California 
Court of Appeal.42 
 In Krinsky, the president of a corporation sued ten Doe defendants 
in Florida for libel and intentional interference with contractual rela-
tions.43 Plaintiff then subpoenaed Yahoo! in California to turn over the 
identities attached to the Does’ screen names.44 Yahoo! notified the 
Does, one of whom, Doe 6, moved to quash on the grounds that disclo-
sure of his identity would violate his First Amendment right to speak 
anonymously.45 The trial court denied the motion to quash, but the 
California appellate court reversed, applying a “prima facie” showing 
standard similar to that used in Brodie,46 though without a separate bal-
ancing test.47 
                                                                                                                      
41 For many Does, of course, this opportunity is meaningless because they cannot ob-
tain legal counsel. The development of standards to protect the rights of Doe defendants is 
directly traceable to the work of public interest litigation groups such as the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, Public Citizen, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Elec-
tronic Privacy Information Center. As noted above, most of the early John Doe actions 
were brought against defendants of modest means. Then as now, many such defendants 
simply could not afford legal counsel to protect their First Amendment rights. For a hand-
ful, however, these public interest organizations provided critical assistance and pursued a 
litigation strategy that prodded judges to develop standards protecting the vitality of Inter-
net speech and the rights of anonymous speakers. While many John Does still have diffi-
culty finding counsel to protect their First Amendment rights, those that can find counsel 
at least have favorable precedent to employ thanks in large part to these organizations. 
42 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 234. 
43 Id. at 234–35. To be precise, the plaintiff sued only nine of the ten for libel. Id. at 
235. 
44 Id. at 235. 
45 Id. 
46 See id. at 244–46. The court tried to avoid being doctrinaire about the “procedural 
label” attached to “the showing required of a plaintiff seeking the identity of an anony-
mous speaker on the Internet” because different states “have different standards govern-
ing pleadings and motions.” Id. at 244. Thus, the court evaluated Krinsky’s showing under 
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 The Krinsky court’s understanding of Internet message boards was 
crucial to its determination of the key issue in the case: whether plain-
tiff had made a prima facie showing that Doe 6’s statements were de-
famatory under Florida law.48 There is no doubt that Doe 6’s statements 
were vulgar and offensive. He called the plaintiff and other corporate 
officers “boobs, losers and crooks”49 and set up a pretend monologue 
by the corporation’s Vice President of Legal Affairs in which he con-
templated performing oral sex on the plaintiff “even though she has fat 
thighs, a fake medical degree, ‘queefs’ and has poor feminine hy-
giene.”50 And plaintiff’s claim that the statements were defamatory had 
more than an initial ring of plausibility. In Florida, a defamatory com-
munication is one which “tends to harm the reputation of another as to 
lower him or her in estimation of community or deter third persons 
from associating or dealing with the defamed party.”51 Certainly accus-
ing someone of criminal behavior and falsification of her medical de-
gree would normally be defamatory if published in an article in a 
newspaper, and yet the court in Krinsky held that Doe 6’s statements 
were not defamatory.52 
 The explanation for this curious result lies in the dichotomy be-
tween fact and opinion. A statement can only be defamatory if it asserts 
or implies objective facts about the plaintiff; otherwise, it will be 
deemed constitutionally protected opinion. The Krinsky court deter-
mined that Doe 6’s assertions were opinion rather than fact based on a 
deeply contextual analysis of his speech.53 The court clearly was influ-
enced by the fact that Doe 6 spoke anonymously on a financial message 
board.54 At the outset, the court noted that the prevalence of anony-
mous speech on the Internet contributes to a “relaxed communication 
style.”55 The court concluded that the informality of Internet message 
boards makes speech there more like “gossip” than “accurate report-
                                                                                                                      
a prima facie evidence standard, which was considered appropriate in light of Florida be-
ing a notice-pleading jurisdiction. See id. at 244–46; see also Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.110. 
47 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244–46. 
48 See id. at 246–50. 
49 Id. at 235. 
50 Id. at 235. 
51 Id. at 246–47 (quoting Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So.2d 774, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973)). 
52 Id. at 250. 
53 See 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 246–50. 
54 See id. at 248–50. The court defined a financial message board as a forum “which of-
fers posters the opportunity to communicate with others concerning stock trading, corpo-
rate behavior, and other finance-related issues.” Id. at 234. 
55 Id. at 237–38. 
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ing,” noting “[h]yperbole and exaggeration are common, and ‘venting’ 
is at least as common as careful and considered argumentation.”56 
 The Krinsky court clearly understood that anonymity is a double-
edged sword. Anonymity frees speakers from inhibitions both good and 
bad. Anonymity makes public discussion more uninhibited, robust, and 
wide-open than ever before, but it also opens the door to more trivial, 
abusive, libelous, and fraudulent speech.57 But the court also under-
stood that vituperative anonymous speech on financial message boards 
often carries its own corrective, for it makes it less likely that reasonable 
readers will take it seriously.58 
 In fact, the court found it incumbent to use care in categorizing 
Doe 6’s speech as defamatory precisely because debate in “Internet 
chat rooms or message boards” is so often “heated and caustic.”59 Doe 6 
did not originate the controversy about plaintiff Krinsky’s management 
of her corporation. Instead, he, along with many other message board 
posters, was responding to articles in the Miami Herald and Bloomberg 
News reporting that the corporation’s Vice President of Legal Affairs 
was not a lawyer, and that he and Krinsky jointly owned a Rolls Royce 
and a $15 million mansion.60 Not surprisingly, these reports triggered 
heated discussion on the message board, of which Doe 6’s comments 
were part and parcel. 
 The tone of Doe 6’s speech was perhaps the biggest indicator that 
he was not implying or asserting actual facts about plaintiff.61 As the 
court noted, Doe 6 used a “sarcastic, derisive tone,”62 “crude, ungram-
matical language,”63 “vulgar and insulting” words,64 and his posts were 
“rude and childish.”65 All of these were cues to the “reasonable reader” 
that his “diatribe”66 against three corporate officers (including plaintiff) 
as boobs, losers, and crooks was not a factual assertion of criminality; 
instead, calling plaintiff a “crook” was merely “juvenile name-calling”67 
and an expression of contempt.68 In a similar vein, the court treated 
                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 238. 
57 Id. (observing that anonymity “opens the door to libel and other tortious conduct”). 
58 See id. at 249. 
59 See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 247. 
60 Id. at 249 n.19. 
61 See id. at 248–50. 
62 Id. at 248. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 249. 
65 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 250. 
66 Id. at 249. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
1384 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1373 
Doe 6’s statement about plaintiff’s “fake medical degree” as non-
factual.69 This accusation was instead “only the latest entry in a pro-
tracted online debate about whether plaintiff’s medical degree from 
Spartan Health Sciences University in the West Indies justified her use 
of the ‘M.D.’ title in company documents.”70 In the context of the dis-
cussion thread from which it arose, the comment was an attempt to 
“ridicule” plaintiff, as were the “satirical” references to her poor femi-
nine hygiene.71 
 The end result was that the court found Doe 6’s speech, reprehen-
sible as it was, constitutionally protected.72 Thus, the court refused to 
allow breach of Doe 6’s anonymity.73 Where a court less well versed in 
Internet culture might have seen invective unworthy of protection,74 
the Krinsky court appreciated both the value of financial message 
boards as a forum for ordinary John Does to discuss corporate affairs 
and the distinctive nature of discourse on those boards.75 
III. Lessons Going Forward 
 The cases above illustrate two trends in John Doe cases from the 
last decade. Courts have both (1) crafted new legal doctrines to protect 
anonymous speech, and (2) adapted existing First Amendment protec-
tions for hyperbole, satire, and other “non-factual” speech to protect 
the distinctive discourse of Internet message boards. These develop-
ments have garnered plenty of scholarly attention, so I shall content 
myself with three loosely connected observations. 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 249. 
72 Id. at 250. 
73 Id. 
74 In one recent case, a federal district court refused to accept a Doe’s argument that 
his posts to an Internet website were not defamatory because they appeared on a message 
board “well-known as a place for inane discussion and meaningless derogatory postings.” 
Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 n.7 (D. Conn. 2008) [hereinafter AutoAdmit]. 
The court reasoned that people who searched for the plaintiff’s name on the Internet 
might find the allegedly defamatory postings about her without knowing “the site’s alleged 
reputation.” Id. Thus, the judge concluded that plaintiff had made out a prima facie defa-
mation case based on the statements themselves, and ordered disclosure of the Doe de-
fendant’s name. Id. For further discussion of the AutoAdmit case, see infra notes 80–106 
and accompanying text. 
75 See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 234–50. 
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A. A Uniform Standard Is Needed (Eventually) 
 The development of appropriate standards to govern the John 
Doe cases has been and continues to be a piecemeal process, develop-
ing case-by-case and court-by-court. Even now, the scope of protection 
for John Doe’s anonymity may depend on where a plaintiff chooses to 
sue (and can establish jurisdiction) and where the defendant’s ISP, or 
the website on which he posted, is located. While courts continue to 
grope toward a consensus, the First Amendment right to speak anony-
mously online is compromised. 
 Even so, there is a positive aspect to piecemeal development of 
legal rules in this area. When the law is asked to solve a problem cre-
ated by new technology, it is hard for the law to “get it right” unless de-
cisionmakers understand not just the technology, but the social and 
cultural uses of the technology as well. The Doe cases illustrate the evo-
lutionary process by which judges have come to understand how differ-
ent Internet fora, and particularly message boards, work and what types 
of conversations take place there. In the meantime, the courts have 
served as “laboratories of experimentation,” working out the kinks in 
the various procedural standards. This is pure speculation, of course, 
but up until this point, this process was probably preferable to having 
federal policymakers jump in with a one-size-fits-all solution to the John 
Doe problem before the social and technological implications were 
clear. Now, however, there is no reason to leave the scope of a constitu-
tional right to be determined by lower courts. Instead, it is time for the 
U.S. Supreme Court to provide definitive guidance as to the proper 
balance between anonymous speech and the protection for reputation. 
B. The David vs. Goliath Paradigm May Be Shifting 
 The need for Supreme Court intervention is particularly urgent 
because there are signs that the Goliath versus David paradigm may be 
shifting, with uncertain implications for future legal developments. 
Paradigm cases are important. One of the reasons courts have been 
willing to adopt balancing tests that tilt in favor of anonymous speech is 
because many of the early John Doe cases involved relatively powerful 
Goliaths trying to silence puny Davids who had deigned to criticize 
them on Internet message boards. Thanks to the hard work of cyber 
civil liberties advocates, courts came to appreciate that John Doe cases 
could involve cyberslapps just as easily as cybersmears, and they cali-
brated the legal doctrines accordingly. But what if judges come to be-
lieve harmful anonymous speech greatly outnumbers valuable anony-
mous speech? How charitable would judges have been in adopting 
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these doctrines if the paradigm anonymous speech cases were “cyber-
bullying” cases against private figures? 
 The recent criminal case against Missouri mom Lori Drew cast the 
public spotlight on the harm that anonymous speakers can cause, and 
even prompted the development of a new legal theory to address that 
harm. The 49-year-old Drew opened a MySpace account as “Josh Evans,” 
a teenage boy, in order to start a correspondence with her 13-year-old 
daughter’s former friend, Megan Meier.76 After winning Meier’s trust, 
“Josh” cruelly “dumped” her by email, telling her: “The world would be 
a better place without you.”77 Meier emailed back: “You’re the kind of 
boy a girl would kill herself over,” and then hanged herself.78 The story 
prompted so much outrage that a federal prosecutor had to concoct a 
way to prosecute Drew.79 Essentially, the jury convicted Drew of “de-
frauding” MySpace by misrepresenting her identity and motives for 
opening an account. Although the Drew case is not a John Doe case, it 
certainly is a cautionary tale about the dangers of anonymous speech. 
 Another potentially paradigm-shifting John Doe case is Doe I v. In-
dividuals, the so-called AutoAdmit case.80 AutoAdmit.com (“AutoAdmit”) 
is a message board for law students and prospective law students to 
share information about admissions, hiring possibilities, and other top-
ics of interest.81 Unfortunately, AutoAdmit also attracts a number of 
posters who use the site to make the most racist, sexist, and generally 
reprehensible posts imaginable.82 Posters using screen names such as 
AK47, stanfordtroll, and Dirty Nigger targeted two Yale law students in 
particular with their venom.83 For example, they posted that one of the 
students, Brittan Heller, had bribed her way into Yale and had a sexual 
affair with a Yale administrator.84 They also posted that the other stu-
                                                                                                                      
76 Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2008, at A25. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 See id. A jury convicted Drew of three misdemeanors for accessing a computer with-
out authorization under the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Id. 
80 (Autoadmit) 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (D. Conn. 2008). The plaintiffs brought copyright 
claims as well as claims for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. Id. at 252. The trial judge later denied one defendant’s motion to quash plaintiffs’ 
subpoena duces tecum to the defendant’s Internet service provider. Id. at 249. For more on 
the factual background of the case, see David Margolick, Slimed Online, Portfolio, Mar. 
2009, at 80, available at http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/ 
2009/02/11/Two-Lawyers-Fight-Cyber-Bullying. 
81 AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
82 See First Amended Complaint, Autoadmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249 (No. 307CV00909 
CFD), 2007 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 7536. 
83 Id. ¶¶ 30, 48–49. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 27, 31. 
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dent, Heide Iravani, had gonorrhea and was addicted to heroin.85 Even 
more alarming were posts in which one poster threatened to force him-
self on Heller and “sodomize her. Repeatedly.”86 One poster made clear 
that he was a fellow Yale law student who had ogled Iravani in the 
gym.87 Another posted a picture of her on a linked website’s “beauty 
contest,” and another wrote that “[w]omen named . . . Heide should be 
raped.”88 To add injury to insult, all of these atrocious comments were 
visible to anyone who chose to Google the names of Heller or Iravani.89 
 Many private-figure victims would lack the resources to bring a 
John Doe suit against their tormentors, particularly where the tormen-
tors would be unlikely to have deep pockets to satisfy claims.90 However, 
the AutoAdmit situation garnered so much publicity that the two 
women were able to get pro bono counsel to go after almost forty John 
Does who had posted on the website.91 They brought defamation, copy-
right infringement, and other claims, and then successfully subpoenaed 
the identities of several of the John Does.92 Although the claims were 
resolved out of court in a confidential settlement, it was clear from the 
outset that the plaintiffs had already won a victory of sorts.93 Some of 
the unmasked defendants apologized or tried to settle;94 some went to 
court;95 and others paid social and professional penalties for their mis-
behavior.96 The board’s moderator finally agreed to remove some of 
                                                                                                                      
85 Id. ¶¶ 50, 54. 
86 Id. ¶ 21. 
87 See id. ¶ 36. 
88 First Amended Complaint, supra note 82, ¶¶ 39, 49. 
89 Id. ¶ 9. 
90 Some of the defendants appear to have had coverage for libel judgments via a 
homeowner’s policy. See Margolick, supra note 80, at 118. 
91 See AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251. 
92 Id. at 252, 257. 
93 Edmund H. Mahony, Ex-Yale Students Settle Internet Defamation Lawsuit, Hartford Cou-
rant, Oct. 22, 2009, at A1, available at http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-
autoadmit1022.artoct22,0,3272457.story. 
94 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 86–87. 
95 See, e.g., AutoAdmit, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 252. 
96 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 86–87. One of the defendants, law student Anthony 
Ciolli, was dismissed from the lawsuit, apparently based on his position as a director or 
administrator of the AutoAdmit website rather than on his own statements about plaintiffs. 
Nonetheless, his prospective employer rescinded his offer of employment upon learning 
of his involvement in the affair, presumably faulting his poor judgment in refusing to cen-
sor the offending posts. Amir Efrati, Law Firm Rescinds Offer to Ex-AutoAdmit Executive, Wall 
Street Journal Law Blog, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/05/03/law-firm-rescinds-offer-to-
ex-autoadmit-director/ (May 3, 2007, 11:02 EST). The plaintiffs were unable to obtain 
some identities because the posters sent their messages from public computers. See Margol-
ick, supra note 80, at 87. 
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the offensive posts about the women, and the suit seems to have had a 
modest civilizing influence on the AutoAdmit message board by re-
minding posters that speech can indeed have consequences.97 More-
over, both plaintiffs have obtained prestigious legal employment, de-
spite the alleged harm to their reputations.98 
 It remains to be seen whether AutoAdmit or other cases highlight-
ing the dark side of anonymous speech will influence future legislation 
or case law.99 One might argue that the case demonstrates the efficacy 
of the “prima facie” balancing test developed in cases like Independent 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie and Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe No. 3. The 
federal district judge in the AutoAdmit case denied defendant AK47’s 
motion to quash a subpoena only after concluding that Heller and Ira-
vani had made out a prima facie case of defamation against him.100 
Unlike the court in Krinsky v. Doe 6, the judge refused to accept the ar-
gument that the allegedly defamatory posts were non-factual because 
they appeared on a message board “well-known as a place for inane dis-
cussion and meaningless derogatory postings.”101 The court reasoned 
that people who searched for the plaintiff’s name on the Internet 
might access the allegedly defamatory postings about her without 
knowing “the site’s alleged reputation.”102 Thus, the prima face case was 
essentially made by the statements themselves, regardless of the mes-
sage board context.103 
 It is worth pointing out that the district judge reasonably could 
have concluded that the statements were actionable even within the 
message board context. Although the message board was filled with 
inane comments, not every comment was meaningless; otherwise, there 
would be no First Amendment justification for protecting these forums. 
Moreover, some of the posters clearly sought to add credibility to their 
postings by claiming to know Heller and Iravani in the off-line world.104 
Many of the posts did include juvenile name-calling (“stupid bitch”) 
                                                                                                                      
97 See Margolick, supra note 80, at 118. 
98 See id. at 86, 118. 
99 As I was writing this section, anonymous speakers in Iran were using their online re-
sources to overcome government censorship and carry their protests against its totalitarian 
practices to the world. See Nazila Fathi, Protesters Defy Iranian Efforts to Cloak Unrest, N.Y. 
Times, June 18, 2009, at A1. 
100 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256–57. 
101 Id. at 256 n.7. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. 
104 See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 82, ¶ 36. 
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and sexist references to the women’s appearances,105 but some of the 
repeated allegations about the sexual behavior of the women arguably 
crossed the line from name-calling into assertions of fact. Even more 
disturbing, a few of the posts arguably fell into the unprotected speech 
category of “true threats,” coupling as they did imprecations of sexual 
violence, posting of pictures of plaintiffs, and the implication that some 
posters had access to the women “off-line.”106 Finally, it bears emphasiz-
ing that the plaintiffs apparently became targets of abuse not because 
they ran a business, held public office, or sought to influence public 
affairs, but simply because of gender, intelligence, and appearance. Al-
though their suit was clearly brought to silence their critics, there was 
relatively little danger of silencing discussion on matters of public con-
cern. 
C. Libel Law Is Only a Partial Remedy for the Real Harms of Cybersmears 
 The AutoAdmit case highlights one of the glaring limitations of li-
bel law: its lack of effective remedies for the real harms suffered by vic-
tims of cybersmears.107 Like many libel plaintiffs, the AutoAdmit plain-
tiffs wanted their dignity restored. They did not want every person who 
Googled their names to discover they had been the targets of young 
men’s verbal abuse and sexual objectification. They wanted the ability 
to manage their own self-representations in the online environment. 
They doubtless wanted to exact vengeance on their tormentors, and, 
more simply, they wanted the offending posts taken down. 
 If libel law provides any of these remedies, it is largely by accident 
rather than design. Libel law gives successful plaintiffs compensatory 
and occasionally punitive damages,108 remedies that are virtually mean-
                                                                                                                      
105 See id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 42. 
106 See id. ¶¶ 25, 36, 39. 
107 As I have argued previously, the application of the actual malice standard in the 
Doe cases, or indeed in any cases involving non-media defendants, is also exceedingly 
problematic. Lidsky, supra note 1, at 915–19. 
108 The obstacles to recovery are high. The common law of defamation is “filled with 
technicalities and traps for the unwary.” David Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair 
Game and Fair Comment II, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1282, 1285 (1942). For more on these techni-
calities, see Lidsky, supra note 1, at 872–74. The constitutional obstacles to plaintiffs’ libel 
actions vary depending on the identity of the plaintiff, the identity of the defendant, and 
the type of speech at issue. See Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty 
Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 Geo. L.J. 1519, 1525–45 
(1987) (charting the constitutional requirements for different types of plaintiffs, defen-
dants, and speech); see also Lidsky, supra note 1, at 874–75. In addition to common law and 
constitutional obstacles to recovery, some states have codified all or parts of their libel law, 
and state constitutional provisions may impose additional obstacles. 
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ingless when the defendant has no money to satisfy a judgment. Cer-
tainly, the act of suing brings some degree of vindication, acting as a 
public declaration of the falsity of defendants’ statements.109 Moreover, 
successfully unmasking a defendant may go a long way toward silencing 
not just that defendant but also others like him. Being unmasked, or 
even the fear of being unmasked, may prompt some defendants to ex-
press contrition and remorse. However, these remedies come from the 
strategic use of litigation rather than from libel law itself, and not even 
the indirect effect of libel law provides plaintiffs with the remedy they 
may desire most, namely, getting offending posts removed from the 
Internet. 
 The absence of a “take down” remedy in defamation law partly ex-
plains the rise of reputation management companies like Reputation-
Defender and Reputation Hawk. These companies provide several ser-
vices. First, they monitor what is being said about their clients online. 
Second, they provide “positive content” to boost a client’s online repu-
tation and shift negative content “down” in search rankings. Third, they 
attempt to “scrub” a client’s reputation by getting damaging content 
removed. Hiring a reputation management company sometimes pro-
vides an attractive alternative to suing for libel because suing often 
brings more attention to the libelous statements. A reputation man-
agement strategy can also be an adjunct to a defamation suit. For ex-
ample, in the AutoAdmit case, ReputationDefender set up a website and 
petition drive to pressure AutoAdmit’s operator to moderate the site 
and remove abusive postings.110 ReputationDefender also enlisted law 
school deans, leading then-Dean Elena Kagan to urge Harvard Law 
School students to boycott AutoAdmit.111 The immediate result was a 
backlash against plaintiffs on the message board, but the longer-term 
result may have been to move the negative postings about them down 
in Google’s search engine ranking.112 
Conclusion 
 For those worried about the harms caused by cybersmears, the 
current state of the law is dispiriting. An angry lover, a disgruntled em-
ployee, or simply a mischievous character assassin can start a campaign 
                                                                                                                      
109 See Randall P. Bezanson et al., Libel Law and the Press 162 (1987) (conclud-
ing that some plaintiffs feel that they win simply by suing). 
110 Margolick, supra note 80, at 86. 
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2009] Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John Doe? 1391 
of lies, and often the victim will have little meaningful recourse. For 
those worried about harms caused by cyberslapps, there are also trou-
bling signs. Courts have developed new legal standards, but the scope 
of protection of this First Amendment right varies greatly by jurisdic-
tion. Even where there are protective legal standards in place, they pro-
vide no real protection to speakers without the resources to hire coun-
sel. Though disheartening, the current state of the law may simply be a 
testament to the difficulty of balancing speech and reputation in the 
Internet age. 
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